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a theoretical framework for a nuanced understanding of how laws and socio-economic 
forces interact in post-colonial settings. Normative intersectionality rejects a legal 
positivist view of rights, which neglects people’s adaptation of indigenous norms to socio-
economic changes. In this sense, normative intersectionality is useful for addressing the 
traditional Igbo law of matrimonial property, which regards a married woman’s property 
rights as subsumed in her husband’s rights. Using the division of marriage gifts in 
Southern Nigeria as a case study, the article draws attention to how legal orders speak to, 
rather than against, each other, and in so doing, stresses the adaptive character of 
indigenous laws. It argues that normative intersectionality illumines the interplay of 
gender equality, property rights and legal pluralism. Accordingly, it urges judges to use the 
imitative nature of legal pluralism in post-colonial settings to remedy entrenched systems 
of injustice and inequality, which often hide under the banner of tradition.  
Keywords: Adaptive legal pluralism, marriage gifts, African customary law, 
matrimonial property rights. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
What happens to a couple’s marriage gifts in the event of a customary law divorce in 
southern Nigeria?1 Marriage gifts are items of material value received by a bride from 
her family and friends to ease her marital experience.2 Their fate during marriage 
dissolution is an important question for law and society scholarship in Africa, especially 
in the context of legal pluralism and conflict of laws.3 Yet, oddly enough, their fate has 
not been addressed in any major scholarly work, even though the majority of African 
women contract customary law marriages, which are still regarded as an alliance 
between two kinship groups.4  
In providing an answer, we introduce the concept of normative intersectionality. 
Ever since Kimberlé Crenshaw created “intersectionality“ in 1989 as a critique of 
difference and explanation of race and gender interaction,5 it has spread beyond critical 
race and gender theories.6 It is now used as an analytic framework for explaining how 
 
1  By southern Nigeria, we mean, primarily, south-east Nigeria, where the Igbo tribe is located. This area 
comprises of Imo, Abia, Anambra, Enugu and Ebonyi states. Predominantly Christian, it has a population 
of about twenty million with a generally homogenous demography. 
2  A detailed explanation of marriage gifts is provided in part 2. 
3  See Bennett TW Application of customary law in southern Africa: the conflict of personal laws Cape Town: 
Juta (1985); Cuskelly K Customs and constitutions: state recognition of customary law around the world 
Bangkok: International Union for Conservation of Nature (2011). 
4  Mair LP African marriage and social change New York: Routledge (1969). 
5  Crenshaw K “Demarginalizing the intersection of race and sex: a black feminist critique of 
antidiscrimination doctrine, feminist theory and antiracist politics” (1989) 1 University of Chicago Legal 
Forum 139 at 139. 
6  See, for example, the works of Jordan-Zachery JS “Am I a black woman or a woman who is black? A few 
thoughts on the meaning of intersectionality” (2007) 3(2) Politics & Gender 254 at 256. Anthias F “The 
material and the symbolic in theorizing social stratification: issues of gender, ethnicity and class” 
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interconnected systems of power affect people on the margins of societal influence.7 In 
its broadest conceptualisation, intersectionality perceives indices of social stratification 
such as race, wealth, gender, age, religion and disability, as interwoven elements that 
create a discernible pattern of power. Thus, rather than isolate these indices, the focus 
should be on their interaction and consequences. By applying intersectionality to law, 
specifically the interaction of legal orders, we seek two objectives.  
First, we emphasise law’s interdisciplinary character, a character that questions the 
doctrine of legal certainty, which dominates judicial approaches to adjudication.8 
Perceiving law as essentially interdisciplinary enables jurists to transcend legalistic 
views of rights, and to connect rights more effectively to their unique social contexts. 
Secondly, we present marriage gifts as an analytical tool for the interface between 
gender equality, women’s property rights, and interaction of laws. As legal 
anthropologists know too well, law cannot be divorced from its social context. Thus, the 
environment in which people articulate and apply social norms, the obliging and 
constraining influences on these norms, and the enforcement mechanisms of norms, are 
intertwined. In this interconnected sense, customary norms of property and the social 
institutions surrounding these norms are “conditioned by culture and social 
organisation” in mutually reinforcing ways.9  
We illustrate this assertion with female genital cutting. Campaigners against this 
cultural practice sometimes find that their biggest obstacle is not opposition from men. 
Rather, it is opposition from elderly women, whose resistance counters the agency of 
young girls opposed to the practice. With their resistance, these elderly women serve as 
structural support for perpetuating genital cutting.10 Another example is how women 
sustain the custom of bride-wealth payment through their non-exercise of agency 
against this custom.11 These two examples demonstrate the mutually reinforcing ways 
through which customary norms and cultural institutions condition each other. 
Underlying this cultural conditioning is the interplay of power, property and philosophy 
within historical contexts. Arguably, the manner in which scholars and policy makers 
approach this interplay goes a long way in explaining the role of law in social change 
 
(2001) 52(3) The British Journal of Sociology 367 at 376; Maynard M “’Race’, gender and the concept of 
‘difference’ in feminist thought” in Afshar H & Maynard M (eds) The dynamics of  ‘race’ and gender  
London: Taylor & Francis (1994); Yuval-Davis N Gender and nation London: Sage(1997); Collins PH 
Black feminist thought: knowledge, consciousness, and the politics of empowerment New York & London : 
Routledge (2001). 
7  Brittney C “Intersectionality” in Disch L & Hawkesworth M (eds) The Oxford handbook of feminist theory 
Oxford: Oxford University Press (2016) at 385-391. 
8  See, for example, South Africa’s Law of Evidence Amendment Act 45 of 1988. 
9  Selznick P “‘Law in context’ revisited’” (2003) 30 Journal of Law and Society 177 at 177. 
10  Gangoli G, Gill A, Mulvihill N & Hester M “Perception and barriers: reporting female genital mutilation” 
(2018) 10 Journal of Aggression, Conflict and Peace Research 251 at 257-258. 
11  Diala JC The interplay of structure and agency: the negotiation process of bridewealth payment in south-
east Nigeria (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Cape Town, 2018). 
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across space and time.12 Accordingly, presenting law as an intersectional creature offers 
some advantages to law and society scholars.  
 
1.1 Why normative intersectionality? 
By privileging the role of values in the interaction of legal orders, the concept of 
normative intersectionality enhances law’s liberation from legal positivist or rule-
minded shackles, which law acquired from its historical roots of conquest, imperialism, 
and colonialism.13 As a historical offspring of conquest, law did not initially tolerate 
values. Rather, it leaned towards the idea that the validity of a given norm is dependent 
on its sources, rather than its merits. Accordingly, pre-20th century jurists operated 
with a theoretical separation of law and morality – the so-called “what law is and what it 
ought to be”.14 Unfortunately, this legal positivist mindset discounted the place of values 
in the concept of legality, thereby influencing jurists like Henry Maine to believe that 
African customary law is not real law.15 Today, no scholar seriously discounts the value 
of values in legal interpretation.  
Secondly, normative intersectionality emphasises the adaptive character of law, 
especially customary law. This adaptive character is needed urgently to curb 
entrenched systems of social inequality, which usually thrive on tradition or established 
usage. All too often, the interaction of legal orders in sub-Saharan Africa raises 
perceptions of conflict of laws.16 Arguably, these conflicts arise from judicial neglect of 
the ways people adapt indigenous norms to socio-economic changes.17 In a way similar  
to that in which the original conceptualisation of intersectionality deemphasises 
difference and identity politics, normative intersectionality draws attention to how legal 
orders speak to, rather than against, each other. Thus, instead of emphasising conflict of 
laws, attention should be focused on the normative consequences of indigenous laws’ 
dialogue with State laws. In this dialogic sense, indigenous values guide normative 
adaptations, while inequality prompts people’s agency for legal change.  
Finally, normative intersectionality cloaks law with an activist or justice-oriented 
outlook, which it needs to cope with unforeseen situations in our rapidly evolving 
 
12 For similar argument, see Diala AC “Legal pluralism and social change: insights from matrimonial 
property rights in Nigeria” in Rautenbach C (ed) In the shade of an African baobab: Tom Bennett’s legacy 
Cape Town: Juta (2018) 155. 
13  See, for example Robertson LG Conquest by law: how the discovery of America dispossessed indigenous 
peoples of their lands Oxford: Oxford University Press (2005); Mellinkoff D The language of the law 2 ed 
Oregon: Resource Publications / Wipf & Stock Publishers (2004). 
14  Hart HLA “Positivism and the separation of law and morals” (1957) 71 Harvard Law Review 593. 
15  Mantena K “Law and ‘tradition’: Henry Maine and the theoretical origins of indirect rule” in Lobban M 
& Lewis A (eds) Law and history: current legal issues vol 6 Oxford: Oxford University Press (2004). 
16  Lehnert W “The role of the courts in the conflict between African customary law and human rights” 
(2005) 21(2) South African Journal on Human Rights 241. 
17  For a similar argument, see Diala AC “The concept of living customary law: a critique” (2017) 49 
Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 143. 
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world. In an age of globalisation, law is increasingly mobile, and mobile law is adaptive 
law.18 This flexible perception of law requires a theoretical framework with a holistic 
view of not just the interaction of laws but also how social actors determine this 
interaction. Indeed, the interconnected socio-economic elements that drive normative 
behaviour ought to form the fulcrum of policy approaches to law. For definitional 
purposes, therefore, normative intersectionality may be described as an analytical 
framework for uncovering the interplay of laws and socio-economic forces in a 
population or social field.19  
Seen in the above context, normative intersectionality sheds light on the 
relationship between the tripartite issues of gender equality, women’s property rights, 
and interaction of laws within a legal system. Against the background of increasing 
global recognition that human rights are indivisible, interconnected, and 
interdependent, these tripartite issues are beginning to dominate the agenda of 
development agents in Africa.20 As we explain below, the interaction of laws, commonly 
referred to as legal pluralism, stands out from these three issues.  
1.2 The adaptive nature of legal pluralism 
At its most basic understanding, legal pluralism means the interactive coexistence of 
laws and normative systems in a population or social field.21 In Africa, this interaction 
usually involves statutory, customary and religious laws in one social field. While 
statutory laws are the transplanted European laws that mutated into State laws after 
colonialism, religious laws are largely products of conquest, and sometimes double as 
indigenous or customary laws.22 The importance of legal pluralism lies in the emergent 
constitutional world order, which is accompanied by coercive international human 
rights laws that increasingly erode classic understandings of State sovereignty. There 
are two broad types, which we will explain in detail because their typologies turn on the 
colonial legal legacy and theoretical understandings of law in sub-Saharan Africa.23 
In the African context, legal pluralism is usually understood as the coexistence of 
customary and religious laws with state laws. In this coexistence, the degree of 
autonomy enjoyed by customary law characterises the nature of African legal pluralism. 
Here, strong or deep legal pluralism is said to exist when customary law enjoys 
 
18  Von Benda-Beckmann F, von Benda-Beckmann K & Griffiths A (eds) Mobile people, mobile law: 
expanding legal relations in a contracting world Aldershot: Ashgate (2005). 
19  These socio-economic forces are notably religion, occupation, income, wealth, influence, and status. 
20  Donnelly J “Human rights, democracy, and development” (1999) 21 Human Rights Quarterly 608 at 
614. 
21  Griffiths J “What is legal pluralism?” (1986) 18 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 1 at 2; 
Merry SE “Legal pluralism” (1988) 22 Law and Society Review 869 at 871. 
22  An example is Islamic law, which Fulani sheikh, Uthman dan Fodio, established in large parts of 
Northern Nigeria in the early 19th century. 
23  For a “theoretical, historical, and comparative purview of legal pluralism” in an African context, see 
Gebeye A “Decoding legal pluralism in Africa” (2017) 49 The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial 
Law 228. 
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considerable autonomy, that is, when it operates with very minimal State regulation.24 
However, this type of legal pluralism is rare because of the systematic manner colonial 
authorities set out to discipline customary law.25 Conversely, weak or State legal 
pluralism exists when the State acknowledges and, in varying degrees, incorporates 
customary law into its legal system.26 This type resembles Merry’s “classic legal 
pluralism”, a term she used to describe “the intersection of indigenous and European 
law” in a colonial context.27 Weak legal pluralism is evident in post(-colonial) measures 
such as codification of customary law, statutory regulation of customary law, judicial 
interpretation of customs with alien legal standards, and even the establishment of 
customary law courts by the State. Since these varying measures are present in all 
African States, weak legal pluralism is the reality in Africa. To properly contextualise 
this reality within the concept of normative intersectionality, we use marriage gifts. 
The division of marriage gifts after divorce in southern Nigeria demonstrates 
dialogue between State laws and indigenous norms, a dialogue with profound 
significance for legal pluralism in post-colonial societies. Using data from interviews 
and focus group discussions we conducted in Imo, Abia, Anambra and Enugu states 
between 2014 and 2016, we argue that legal pluralism in Africa is essentially imitative 
in nature. The data that informs this argument was elicited from 159 research 
participants. They include married and engaged couples, female divorcees, social 
welfare officials, traditional leaders, clergy, and the staff of non-governmental 
organisations.  
Following this introduction, part 2 of the article explains the contextual background 
of marriage gifts. In so doing, we emphasise the communal character of the agrarian 
social settings in which the customary law of matrimonial property developed in 
Nigeria. Part 3 reveals the interplay of intersectional forces in contemporary customary 
marriages. These forces are notably State laws, customs, traditional institutions, and the 
changing nature of family property. In turn, the changing nature of property is induced 
by urbanisation, individualism, women’s independent income, formal education, 
Western acculturation, and the consequential decrease in the concept of the extended 
family. We demonstrate the role of the Social Welfare Department in normative 
intersectionality. This Department, a statutory body mandated to protect the interests 
of women and children, straddles State laws and indigenous laws by increasingly 
ordering men to share matrimonial property and/or pay compensation to women. We 
argue that its quasi-judicial orders in respect of marriage gifts and properties bought by 
 
24 The degree of autonomy between State law and customary law in deep legal pluralism is unclear. 
Generally, it seems to be when the State is not obliged to “incorporate cultural or religious forms of 
non-state law into state law”. See Rautenbach C “Deep legal pluralism in South Africa: judicial 
accommodation of non-state law” (2010) 42 Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law 143 at 146.  
25  Ocran M “The clash of legal cultures: the treatment of indigenous law in colonial and post-colonial 
Africa” (2006) 39 Akron Law Review 465 at 468. 
26  Woodman GR “Legal pluralism and the search for justice” (1996) 40 Journal of African Law 152 at 157. 
27  Merry (1988) at 872. 
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women contribute to adaptations in the customary law of matrimonial property in 
Nigeria. Part 4 concludes with recommendations.  
 
2. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND OF MARRIAGE GIFTS  
To understand the historical background of marriage gifts in Nigeria, one needs an 
appraisal of the Nigerian legal system. Like other African States, the array of rules and 
principles strutting as State laws in Nigeria are restatements, adaptations, and plain 
reproductions of European laws and principles, which were imposed by colonial 
administrators. Like elsewhere also, Nigeria retained the legislative and judicial 
structures of its colonial legal architecture after it gained political independence.28 
Accordingly, Nigeria’s legal system is a mix of largely oral customary laws, religious 
(mainly Islamic) laws, and statutory laws (State laws).29 Although people are free to opt 
for customary law in personal issues such as marriage and inheritance, the restrictive 
regulations of State laws and the oral nature of many customs make legal pluralism 
difficult.30 This difficulty is not helped by lacunas  in the legislative framework.  Indeed, 
there is no statutory regulation of customary law marriages, no direct recognition of 
customary law marriages in mainstream marriage laws, and no express subjection of 
customary law to the Bill of Rights.  
The 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Constitution), which 
shares law making powers between the federal and 36 state governments, omits their 
legislative power over customary law. Ordinarily, this silence ought to indicate the 
existence of deep legal pluralism. However, it does not, since the Constitution 
establishes customary courts, outlines their position in the hierarchy of courts, and 
stipulates the qualifications of their judges.31 Significantly, these judges interpret 
customary law with a colonial legal standard, which enjoys statutory protection in the 
Evidence Act and court laws. A typical example of this standard, widely known as the 
repugnancy clause, states that “where any custom is relied upon, it shall not be enforced 
as law if it is contrary to public policy or is not in accordance with natural justice, equity 
and good conscience”.32 So, from the outset, the recognition of customary law in Nigeria 
is subjected to stringent and alien judicial standards. Regrettably, these standards often 
ignore the social contexts of customary law, thereby creating dissonance between 
 
28  Part one titled “Foundations of the Government” in Awa EO Federal government in Nigeria California: 
University of Chicago Press (1964). 
29  Section 45(1) of the Interpretation Act, Cap 89, Laws of Nigeria and Lagos 1958.  
30 Nwauche ES “The constitutional challenge of the integration and interaction of customary and the 
received English common law in Nigeria and Ghana” (2010) 25 Tulane European & Civil Law Forum 37 
at 40-47; Obilade AO “The relevance of customary law to modern Nigerian society” in Osinbajo & Kalu 
(eds) Towards a restatement of Nigerian customary laws Lagos: Federal Ministry of Justice (1991).  
31  In descending order, the federal courts are the Supreme Court of Nigeria, the Court of Appeal, the 
Federal High Court, customary courts of appeal, and the Sharia Court of Appeal of the Federal Capital 
Territory. State courts are high courts, State Sharia courts of appeal, State customary courts of appeal, 
magistrate courts, customary courts, and area courts. See ss 237-288 of the Constitution.  
32  Section 18(3) of the Evidence Act of 2011. 
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customary law and its foundational values. A good example of this dissonance is a 
curious statute known as the Dowry Law.33  
The Dowry Law claims to regulate the quantum of bride wealth in south-east 
Nigeria. However, it is so widely ignored that it might as well not exist.34 Its failure may 
be attributed to two primary reasons. The first and most obvious reason relates to the 
full- belly thesis – in that the socio-economic needs of people trump their obligation to 
comply with the State’s pathetic attempt to regulate an intimate aspect of their cultural 
lives. The second and less obvious reason is the radical changes in the agrarian social 
settings in which the practice of bride wealth payment emerged. Prior to the 
acceleration of socio-economic changes by colonial rule, customary laws operated in 
communal social settings in which families lived in close-knit units.35 In these settings, 
bride wealth served a symbolic role as the legitimating mark of a customary law 
marriage. Accordingly, it was provided in the form of livestock and food items.36 
Sometimes, it was offered in the form of service by the groom to the bride’s father. 
Following the advent of commercialisation, migrant labour, and the Western 
acculturation that was embedded in formal education, its symbolism receded.   
Today, people perceive bride wealth as an avenue to escape from poverty, or an 
opportunity to acquire wealth.37 Thus, while bride wealth continues to symbolise a valid 
customary law marriage, the ideas and practices surrounding its quantum have adapted 
to the socio-economic changes brought by the colonial experience. Unfortunately, the 
Dowry Law adopted a top-down or rule-minded approach to these adaptations, thereby 
exacerbating the dissonance between foundational values and actual practice of cultural 
norms. We will show in part 3 how Nigerian judges follow a similar rule-minded 
approach to issues of marriage gifts. But what are marriage gifts?  
2.1  Marriage gifts in Igboland 
The Igbo are one of the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria. Previously, they used to be 
confined to the geo-political area referred to as South-East Nigeria. Currently, they have 
a significant population in the south and north of Nigeria (Lagos and Abuja), and are in 
good numbers in other parts of the country. Like the Jews, they take their customs 
wherever they go, and marriage is the most prominent of these customs. Marriage gifts 
are known in Igbo parlance as “ihe eji edu nwanyi ulo” (things used to accompany a 
woman home).38 As the name implies, they are items given to the bride by her family 
 
33  Limitation of Dowry Law, Eastern Region Law No 23 of 1956, now Cap 76 Laws of Eastern Nigeria 
1963. 
34  Diala (2018) at 33.  
35  The reasons for such social settings range from agriculture to defence from wild animals and 
marauders.  
36  Agbasiere JT Women in Igbo life and thought New York: Routledge (2000) at 109-110. 
37  Izunwa MO “A critique of certain aspects of the grounds, procedure and reliefs attaching to customary 
divorce law in Southern Nigeria” (2015) 7 (5) Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution 31 at 35. 
38 “Ihe eji edu nwanyi ulo” reflects the Owerri dialect. It is expressed slightly differently in other parts of 
Igboland. 
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and friends during or shortly after marriage to make her marriage experience 
comfortable. In southern Nigeria, marriage gifts differ from the gifts brought by a groom 
as part of the requirements of bride wealth.39 This differentiation is necessary, as some 
African communities conflate marriage gifts with bride wealth.40 For example, writing 
about Malawi, Mwambene described marriage gifts (Chikole) as “a gift from a boy to a 
girl in form of clothing, household effects or money given at a time of proposing 
marriage. The gift may be returnable upon termination of betrothal. However, it is not 
essential for the validity of a marriage”.41 Similarly, Nsereko confusingly used “marriage 
gifts” to refer to bride wealth in his quest to disown the notion that customary marriage 
is “woman purchase”.42 Among the Igbos of Nigeria, the key distinction between bride 
wealth and ihe eji edu nwanyi ulo is source and function. Whereas bride wealth and its 
associated gifts emanate from the groom and are legal obligations for the validity of a 
customary marriage, marriage gifts come primarily from the bride’s family and are not 
requirements for a valid marriage. Two main reasons are responsible for this 
distinction. 
First, marriage gifts are post-factum, since they are only given to a bride after the 
conclusion of the marriage. Also, unlike the customarily stipulated or even regimented 
gifts that form part of bride wealth, marriage gifts are discretionary in form and 
substance. So, while a groom may not opt out of the gifts that form part of bride wealth, 
no such obligation exists for ihe eji edu nwanyi ulo. Secondly, the range and quantum of 
marriage gifts are dependent on the financial ability of the bride’s family, their 
relationship with their daughter, and the degree to which they love or accept their son-
in-law. Thus, it is not out of place for a wealthy father-in-law to buy a house for his 
daughter, secure a job for his son-in-law, furnish the couple’s house, or buy a vehicle for 
their use. All these discretionary actions are modern expressions of marriage gifts. 
Conversely, a groom may be compelled to delay marriage rites until he acquires the 
financial means to comply with bride wealth requirements.43  
There are two general categories of marriage gifts, categories that reflect 
continuities and discontinuities in marriage relations in southern Nigeria. The first 
category is gifts received by a bride from her parents and extended family. In the past, 
 
39  Osom J Moral implication of high bride-price in Nigeria: Annang case survey (unpublished PhD thesis, 
Rome: Academia Alfonsiana, 1989) at 34. 
40  For example, in a bid to disown the notion that customary marriage is not a “woman purchase”, 
Nsereko used the phrase “marriage gifts” to refer to bride wealth. See Nsereko D “The nature and 
function of marriage gifts in a customary African marriage” (1975) 23(4) American Journal of 
Comparative Law 682 at 682. 
41  Mwambene L Divorce in matrilineal customary law marriage in Malawi: a comparative analysis with the 
patrilineal customary law marriage in South Africa (unpublished LLM thesis, University of the Western 
Cape, 2005) at 14 fn 40. 
42  Nsereko (1975) at 683. 
43  Ntoimo LFC & Isiugo-Abanihe UC “Determinants of singlehood: a retrospective account by older single 
women in Lagos, Nigeria” (2014) 27 African Population Studies 386 at 388 & 390; Odimegwu C, 
Pallikadavath S & Adedini S “The cost of being a man: social and health consequences of Igbo 
masculinity” (2013) 15 (2) Culture, Health and Sexuality 219 at 226. 
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this category consisted exclusively of cooking utensils and items of adornment such as 
jewellery, clothes and sandals. Presently, they include modern gadgets such as houses, 
cars, refrigerators, television sets, dishwashers and household furniture. In fact, rarely 
does a bride depart for her husband’s house without receiving some household 
furniture, no matter how small the quantity is. The second category of ihe eji edu nwanyi 
ulo is gifts given to the couple by their friends. Here, the gifts may be given in the 
matrimonial name of the couple, usually when received from their mutual friends, or in 
their individual names when received from a friend of either party. This category also 
includes gifts given to the bride ostensibly for her own benefit. As we explain in part 3, 
this category often presents problems during marriage dissolution, given the difficulty 
of determining whether household furniture is intended for the bride’s use. Just like the 
first category, the forms of gifts in this category have changed. 
2.2  Marriage gifts then and now 
In the pre-colonial past, ihe eji edu nwanyi ulo reflected the state of Igbo society. This 
society was essentially agrarian, collective, and close-knit. Families worked together to 
produce wealth consisting basically of farm produce and livestock.44 In this communal 
social setting, marriage was primarily a union between families, rather than the union 
between two individuals it has largely become.45 For example, the selection of marriage 
partners, arrangements for marriage ceremonies, and payment of bride wealth, were 
generally organised by the couple’s parents and extended families. Importantly, 
investigations were (and still are) conducted by the couple’s families to determine their 
suitability for marriage. Unsurprisingly, a bride was accepted as an integral part of her 
husband’s family, with the same property status as her husband’s siblings. She engaged 
in craftwork, cultivated land and reared livestock, just as a member of the family. While 
this communal context of marriage was reflected in the meaning and forms of bride 
wealth, it greatly influenced the celebration of marriage and the types of marriage gifts 
given to a bride by her family.46 Being very invested in the success of the marriage, the 
extended family reflected their trust in the groom’s family’s ability to care for their 
daughter through ihe eji edu nwanyi ulo. Thus, marriage gifts consisted only of kitchen 
utensils, clothes, and jewellery, since the basic household furniture needed by the bride 
for a comfortable marriage experience was available in her new home.  
The social setting described above contributed to the evolution of the customary 
law of matrimonial property. This law restricts divorcing women’s property rights to 
their “wearing apparels, beddings, and cooking utensils”.47 Faced with this restriction, 
 
44  Mere AA “Contemporary changes in Igbo family system” (1976) 6 International Journal of Sociology of 
the Family 155 at 156. 
45 Isiugo-Abanihe UC “Consequences of bridewealth changes on nuptiality patterns among the Ibo of 
Nigeria” in Bledsoe C & Gilles P (eds) Nuptiality in sub-Saharan Africa: contemporary anthropological 
and demographic perspectives Oxford: Clarendon Press (1994) 74. 
46  Isiugo-Abanihe (1994) 74. 
47  Duruaku v Duruaku & another (unreported) Suit No CC/EZ/IK/2D/2004 Judgment of 26 March 2009 at 
2; Lancaster Ubani v Beatrice Ubani (unreported) Suit No CC/EZ/39/2000 Judgement of 29 April 2004. 
See also Obi SNC (assisted by Anyaegbunam CDC et al) The customary law manual: a manual of 
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divorcing women have little recourse to the courts, given the lack of constitutional 
regulation of customary law and its barely defined interaction with State laws in 
Nigeria.  
As a core component of matrimonial property, marriage gifts in pre-colonial times 
stand in stark contrast to their contemporary forms. In the past, these gifts were 
unsophisticated, given from group generated wealth, and surrounded by communal 
rights and obligations. Today, however, the situation has changed drastically. First, the 
extended family or kinship group is disappearing, along with its strong role in 
marriages. Secondly, women increasingly acquire properties alongside their husbands 
through independent income and sophisticated marriage gifts from friends and families. 
Thirdly, the nature of matrimonial property has assumed modern forms that are 
uncontemplated by the customary law of (matrimonial) property.48 Given the lacuna in 
Nigeria’s legislative framework, these changes place marriage gifts at the centre of an 
uncertain legal situation during divorce. We now turn to how people are navigating the 
division of marriage gifts during divorce and the socio-legal forces that drive their 
attitude. 
 
3. NORMATIVE INTERSECTIONALITY IN MARITAL PROPERTY DIVISION  
As seen in part 2, the extended family played a very strong role in marriage. Arguably, 
this role contributed to the rarity of divorce, since the family was the first port of call for 
resolving matrimonial disputes.49 Indeed, a wife’s family had special motivation for 
resolving marital problems between their daughter and her husband, since they could 
be compelled to repay bride wealth in the event of divorce. On the rare occasions where 
their interventions failed, a divorced woman was entitled to return to her parent’s 
house with all her marriage gifts, given that they consisted of only kitchen utensils and 
items of adornment. Her ability to exit marriage with these properties was aided by the 
fact that the couple, generally, followed the due process of divorce, which usually 
involved the family members of both parties.50 This divorce process was elaborate, 
often involved the return of the bride wealth, and sometimes included some sort of 
ritual ceremony or the carrying of certain types and quantities of palm wine.51  
Today, many men do not follow the due process of divorce, while some do not 
participate in, nor consent to the decisions of family mediation. In any event, attitudes 
to matrimonial property division are increasingly coming under the strong influence of 
 
customary laws obtaining in the Anambra and Imo states of Nigeria Enugu: Ministry of Justice Anambra 
(1977). 
48  See Diala AC “The shadow of legal pluralism in matrimonial property division outside the courts in 
southern Nigeria” (2018) 18 African Human Rights Law Journal 706 at 710, 719 & 728. 
49 Ekpe CP “Social welfare and family support: the Nigerian experience” (2014) 10 Journal of Sociology & 
Social Welfare 484 at 487.   
50  See generally, Kuye PO “Rights of women under customary law” in Osinbajo Y & Kalu A (eds) Towards a 
restatement of Nigerian customary laws Lagos: Federal Ministry of Justice (1991) 385. 
51  Olisah SO The Ibo native law and custom Onitsha: New Era Press (1963) at 19. 
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State law values,52 the doctrinal demands of Christianity, and the acculturation 
influences of liberal Western philosophies. In this context of interconnected influences, 
the changing forms of marriage gifts and marital disputes reveal normative 
intersectionality in the division of matrimonial property during the dissolution of a 
customary law marriage. To contextualise the operation of this intersectionality, we 
first explain the philosophy of marriage gifts division.  
3.1 Philosophy of marriage gifts division 
The traditional Igbo customary law of matrimonial property regards a wife as part of 
her husband’s property. This philosophy, which made sense in the communal, agrarian 
settings described in part 2, resembles ‘feme covert,’ a legal doctrine that thrived in 
medieval Europe.53 Under feme covert, a married woman’s legal rights and liabilities 
were subsumed under her husband’s rights in a manner that rendered her legally 
invisible. Diala illustrates the Igbo customary law of matrimonial property with the 
ancient story of a chief who bequeathed all but one portion of his estate to his chief 
slave.54 Faced with the option of choosing only one portion, the chief’s only son regained 
all his father’s estate by declaring: “Since you [chief slave] are part of my father’s 
property, I choose you.” Accordingly, the following discussion of marriage gifts division 
during divorce constitutes, in many ways, changes in this traditional philosophy. We 
argue that these changes reflect normative intersectionality.  
There is fair agreement among the majority of our research participants that a 
divorcing woman is entitled to exit her marriage with whatever her family gave her as 
marriage gifts. These gifts would usually include items of adornment and household 
furniture. The rationale is that every gift identifiable as emanating from the woman’s 
family belongs to her. This rationale is especially reinforced if the divorce is initiated by 
the man. A social welfare official in the focus group summarised it as follows: “If her 
husband drives her away, he is obliged to return all that her relatives gave her as 
marriage gifts. But if she decided to leave on her own, those things will remain in her 
husband’s house because he performed traditional rites over her.”55  
Significantly, fault, as a key element in the division of matrimonial property under 
customary law, is more pronounced today than it was in the past. Indeed, fault 
previously played a trivial role, which arose mainly from the fact that men were free to 
marry more than one wife.56 Men’s polygamous ability gave them certain latitude in 
 
52  Such as, the best interest of the child principle in children’s laws, a principle that is fiercely protected 
by State welfare officials. 
53  Blackstone W Commentaries on the laws of England vol 1 William Carey Jones (ed) (1976) at 443–445. 
54  Diala AC “A critique of the judicial attitude towards matrimonial property rights under customary law 
in Nigeria’s southern states” (2018) 18 African Human Rights Law Journal 100 at 103-104.  
55  This position was unanimously approved by the ten other social welfare officials in the group 
discussion on 14 January 2015, and by traditional leaders in a separate discussion on 15 January 2015.  
56  Nwogugu EI Family law in Nigeria 3 ed Ibadan: Heinemann Publishers (2014) at 233; Obi SN Modern 
family law (London: Sweet & Maxwell (1966) at 364 & 366-367; Achike O “Problems of creation and 
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respect of the traditional elements of marital wrongdoing such as adultery and cruelty. 
Today, men’s polygamous freedom is decreasing, judging from the monogamous views 
of marriage expressed by many informants. This decrease is accompanied by weightier 
reliance on wrongdoing as a mitigating or aggravating factor in property division. The 
influence of fault is so significant that women who abandon their marriage or initiate 
their divorce are deemed to forfeit their marriage gifts because of real or presumed 
disinterest in matrimonial property. Conversely, women whose husbands initiate 
divorce for flimsy reasons are deemed to have strong entitlements to marriage gifts and 
other matrimonial property. Alongside monogamy and the fault principle, equitable 
notions of property division are products of normative intersectionality, of which State 
laws, Christian doctrines, Western education, and acculturation are prominent stimuli. 
We shall use the roles of traditional leaders, clergy, and the Social Welfare Department 
in the division of marriage gifts to illustrate this intersectionality. 
3.2  Division of marriage gifts 
Nigerians are yet to embrace the idea of prenuptial agreements, for much the same 
reason that they dislike the adoption of wills.57 Since marriage gifts are increasingly 
given to the couple by their friends, recovery or division of these gifts during divorce is 
complicated. This complication arises from changes in the nature of the beneficiary of 
marriage gifts. Unlike in the pre-colonial era, these gifts are no longer given to the bride 
for her exclusive use.58 Where marriage gifts are received from friends of the couple, 
two broad courses are commonly followed.  
When the gifts are given in the name of the couple, which is usually the family name 
of the husband, he generally takes them, unless he is at fault for the divorce. This 
situation reflects the unequal gender relations of married couples under customary law. 
Apart from women’s restricted property rights, there are several manifestations of 
these unequal relations. The most notable are the bride’s relocation to her husband’s 
home, change of name to her husband’s family name, and patrilineal lineage for the 
children of the marriage.59  
As explained above, the traditional view of matrimonial property subsumes a 
married woman’s property rights under her husband’s rights. However, this view is not 
cast in stone. Where the woman is relatively blameless in the marital dispute leading to 
the divorce, change agents such as social welfare officials and non-profit organisations 
could award her marriage gifts given in the couple’s name. Where the woman has 
children, her chances of winning marriage gifts increase dramatically.60 The motivations 
for these awards vary. Although natural justice features in the division of marriage gifts, 
 
dissolution of customary marriages in Nigeria” in Roberts S (ed) Law and the family in Africa The 
Hague: Mouton (1977) at 151.  
57  Prenuptial agreements and wills are shunned for fear of jinxing one’s life or relationship.  
58  The authors attended numerous weddings where marriage gifts from friends outnumbered and out-
valued those given by the bride’s family. 
59  Ejidike OM “Human rights in the cultural traditions and social practice of the Igbo of south-eastern 
Nigeria” (1999) 43 Journal of African Law 71 at 86-96. 
60 Diala “The shadow” (2018) at 718. 
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the key motivations appear to lie in two categories of State laws, which require 
explanation to drive home the operation of normative intersectionality.  
The first category of State laws may be described as institutional, that is, decisions 
emanating from bodies established by statute to perform judicial and quasi-judicial 
functions. For example, the State Welfare Department, which mediates in and 
adjudicates over matrimonial disputes, is a statutory body with the primary mandate of 
promoting the best interests of women and children. The second category may be 
described as substantive. Here, the Constitution, children’s rights laws, and 
international human rights instruments feature prominently. Thus, social welfare 
officials and non-profit organisations engaged in the resolution of matrimonial property 
disputes sometimes cite these laws as justification for awarding marriage gifts to 
women. The rationale is that the award affirms women’s dignity and assists them to 
care for their children.61  
However, traditional arbitration is not as generous as social welfare officials and 
non-profits are in awarding women marriage gifts given in the name of the couple. As a 
traditional leader vehemently declared during a focus group discussion: “This statement 
that a woman goes with property is not our custom! It is discretionary! … Regardless of 
fault – ie, whether the man drives her away or she goes on her own – a woman [exits 
marriage] with nothing.” 
Recovery of non-monetary property given to the bride is difficult where the couple 
had made joint use of them. While some key informants asserted that property given by 
friends should be shared equitably between the couple when the marriage ends, the 
majority believed that the circumstances of the divorce, especially fault, should 
determine the mode of sharing. Understandably, divorcees believe that marriage gifts 
from friends should be shared equitably, even though many of them made no notable 
effort to claim them.  
Interestingly, the ownership of gifts given to the bride by her family does not 
escape controversy during marriage dissolution. Long ago, when bride wealth used to 
have a purely symbolic meaning, the livestock, yams, and other food items that 
constituted bride wealth were provided by the groom’s extended family. This communal 
contribution to bride wealth has largely disappeared, as the groom and/or his parents 
provide it with their independent income. Similarly, the items that constitute bride 
wealth are increasingly monetised. Sometimes, the bride’s family uses part of the 
monetised bride wealth to buy marriage gifts for the bride. Accordingly, where the 
groom contributed to the purchase of marriage gifts given to the bride by her relatives, 
it could result in her loss of these gifts upon dissolution of the marriage. Given the 
unequal gender relations in south-east Nigeria, her husband could refuse to allow her to 
exit the marriage with the gifts, or insist, in an arbitral hearing, on retaining them. A 
traditional leader explained the complicated rationale for husbands’ interests in 
marriage gifts given by the bride’s family: 
 
61 Diala “The shadow” (2018) at 718. 
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“[After divorce], the woman has right to take whatever she got from her family 
as marriage gifts. This is because those gifts were bought for her or in her name 
or in her family’s name. But what I am showing here is this: you see, this was 
usually in the past. Today’s people are cunning. In the past, when marrying, there 
were requirements that the groom’s family must satisfy – things they must bring 
to contribute to the items that will be bought as marriage gifts for the bride. If 
you are not careful or attentive, you will not really understand what is involved. 
For example, you may be told to bring five pounds to help us contribute – even if 
it is twenty pounds – to help us purchase the items to send forth our daughter 
into marriage. When you bring that five pounds, they may only add three pounds 
to it and buy kitchen utensils such as pounder, pots, and other things of that era 
used to send forth a woman. … If she eventually has problem with her husband, 
she will want to take all those things as her marriage gifts, whereas the man 
contributed about 70 percent of the money with which they were bought. This is 
why the custom in these parts has changed. These days, people are no longer 
willing for their in-laws to send forth their bride. They prefer to buy whatever 
their bride will need. This means that … whatever he buys belongs to him. But 
when the marriage collapses, his authority over the things he bought does not 
extend to the woman’s wearing apparels and adornments. He cannot stop her 
from taking those things even if she has no child. “ 
 
As the quoted informant hinted, a husband’s right to marriage gifts does not extend to 
his wife’s clothes and items of adornment. Similarly, it does not extend to marriage gifts 
and property purchased in his wife’s maiden name. This last category often involves 
purchase receipts, which are regarded as an important proof of ownership in judicial 
and quasi-judicial matrimonial proceedings. 
3.3  The role of purchase receipts  
Normative intersectionality is evident in many court laws, which prohibit parties from 
relying on customs where the issue in dispute is unknown to customary law. For 
example, section 26 of the High Court Law of Lagos states:  
“No party shall be entitled to claim the benefit of any customary law, if it shall 
appear either from express contract or from the nature of the transactions out of 
which any suit or questions may have arisen, that such party agreed that his 
obligations in connection with such transactions should be exclusively regulated 
otherwise than by customary law or that such transactions are transactions 
unknown to customary law.” 
Ordinarily, the use of purchase receipts is unknown to indigenous law and ought to fall 
under legislation such as section 26. However, where receipts are objected to during 
disputes as being uncontemplated by indigenous law, judges routinely disagree, thereby 
encouraging the recognition of documentary evidence under customary law. Indeed, as 
far back as 1944, Waddington J noted the encroachment of this type of evidence into 
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arbitral proceedings.62 He held that customary law still applies “where the document [in 
issue] amounts to no more than the kind of ‘paper’ which most natives nowadays like to 
have as evidence of a money transaction, and which at this day, is, I suppose, quite a 
familiar object in most native courts, and frequently bearing an impressive array of 
stamps.”63 
In the foregoing sense, the property which married women buy in their maiden 
names reveals the significant influence of socio-economic forces on the customary law 
of matrimonial property division. The general opinion of research participants is that 
women may recover property bought with their independent income if the purchase 
receipts are issued in their own names rather than in their married names. Suppose a 
woman named Miss Joy Okonkwo marries a man named Mr Johnson Amadi. If, 
thereafter, she bought a car and obtained a receipt issued in the name of Joy Okonkwo, 
her maiden name, the car is deemed to belong to her in the event of divorce. This view is 
supported by the judicial approach to matrimonial property, which recognises that 
women may claim matrimonial property with the aid of documentary evidence.64 
Although judges are willing to uphold women’s claims of property using receipts, they 
are yet to recognise women’s beneficial interest in matrimonial property.65 Thus, 
women who contributed to the acquisition of matrimonial property by making 
undocumented contributions from their independent income and/or through their 
emotional support of their husbands, could nevertheless leave a marriage empty-
handed. In this sense, purchase receipts demonstrate the intersectional influence of 
socio-economic changes in matrimonial proceedings and how this influence could 
encourage changes in customary law behaviour.  
4. CONCLUSION  
The traditional Igbo customary law of matrimonial property regards married women’s 
property rights as subsumed under those of their husbands. This custom arose in 
agrarian social settings, in which wealth was produced jointly, property was basic, and 
the extended family was so invested in marriages that divorce rarely occurred. 
Moreover, divorced women were easily reintegrated into their families. However, the 
social settings of this custom have changed. The extended family is disappearing, 
household properties have become sophisticated, and women now contribute to 
matrimonial property through their independent income and receipt of marriage gifts. 
Regrettably, these changes receive little encouragement from Nigeria’s legislative 
framework, which neither regulates customary law marriages (and their proprietary 
consequences) nor subjects customary law’s recognition to the Bill of Rights.   
 
62 Rotibi v Savage (1944) 17 Nigerian Law Reports 17. 
63 Rotibi v Savage (1944) 17 Nigerian Law Reports 17 at 82. 
64  For instance, the Court of Appeal ruled in Onwuchekwa v Onwuchekwa (1991) 5 NWLR (Pt 194) 739 
that a wife must provide “sufficient proof”, such as “receipts”, to show her contribution to matrimonial 
property. See also Amadi v Nwosu (1992) NWLR (Pt 241) 273; (1992) LPELR 442 (SC).   
65  Diala “A critique” (2018) at 118.  
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Faced with an indifferent legislative framework, judges have three broad options, 
all of which are significant for legal pluralism. First, they could apply the customary law 
of matrimonial property using the rule minded philosophy of legal certainty. This 
philosophy thrives on judicial precedents, textbooks and oral history. Secondly, they 
could declare this ancient custom repugnant to natural justice, equity and good 
conscience, claiming that it is unfair to women for failing to recognise their beneficial 
interest in matrimonial property. Thirdly, they could invalidate this custom for its 
incompatibility with the social settings in which it emerged. For this, they could rely on 
the adaptability of customs to socio-economic conditions. As of now, judges have yet to 
choose the second and third options. This is the legal context in which we used the 
concept of normative intersectionality to analyse the division of marriage gifts during a 
customary law divorce.  
Inspired by Crenshaw’s notion of intersectionality, a critical race and gender 
theory, we offered normative intersectionality as an analytical framework for 
uncovering the interplay of laws and socio-economic forces in legal pluralistic settings. 
We argued that normative intersectionality highlights the adaptive character of 
customary law, a character that is suppressed by entrenched systems of social 
inequality, which are often concealed under the banner of tradition or established 
usage. Normative intersectionality abounds in customary law divorce, during which 
women lay claim to marriage gifts received from their families, as well as properties 
they bought in their maiden names.   
On the one hand, women find it difficult to recover marital property or to benefit 
from its division when such property is in the marital name of the couple.  This difficulty 
is due to the traditional philosophy of matrimonial property, which regards wives as 
part of their husbands’ possessions. On the other hand, women may recover 
matrimonial property with the aid of purchase receipts, which were unknown to 
customary law. They may also win property through change agents such as the Social 
Welfare Department and non-profit organisations, which promote the best interests of 
women and children in the shadow of State law. In all these, the division of matrimonial 
property during divorce under customary law involves interconnected socio-economic 
influences that give married women novel platforms for making property claims they 
would otherwise not be entitled to. Their ability to recover marriage gifts and claim 
matrimonial property with purchase receipts is thus an adaptation of customs to socio-
economic changes, which is highlighted by the concept of normative intersectionality.  
Normative intersectionality offers policy makers a nuanced view of legal pluralism, 
one which privileges the dialogue between indigenous laws and State laws in fluid social 
fields. In the context of marriage gifts, policy perceptions of women’s matrimonial 
property rights in Nigeria must take cognisance of dissonance in the communal settings 
of pre-colonial society and the individualistic settings of contemporary society. Above 
all, policy makers must factor in how people’s normative struggles with this dissonance 
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